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before serving a notice of examination before trial. Moreover,
it had waited until eight months after the plaintiff had filed a
note of issue to move for dismissal. In addition, the defendant
had not shown that it had been prejudiced. The plaintiff, on the
other hand, had shown a high degree of merit in its cause of
action. Thus, even though four years and four months had
elapsed between the completion of pretrial disclosure and the filing
of the note of issue, the defendant's motion was denied.
All discretion involves the weighing of concrete factors and,
in the case of a CPLR 3216 motion, it seems reasonable to place
some weight upon the defendant's delay. There is apparent unfairness in a rule that would permit a defendant to delay, while
granting the same defendant a windfall because of the plaintiff's
similar delay.
CPLR 3216: Dismissal uider Delaware statute is on the nzerits.
In November, 1958, an action was brought by the plaintiff
in the Superior Court of Delaware. In March, 1963, after almost
five years of delay, the complaint was dismissed because of the
failure to prosecute pursuant to Civil Rule 41(b) of the Rules
of the Superior Court of Delaware. Rule 41(b) provides that
an involuntary dismissal, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as an adjudication
on the merits unless the order otherwise specifies. The plaintiff
then brought the same action against the same defendant in
New York. The defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR
3211(a) (5), on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action was
barred by res judicata, was granted by the court in Signorile v.
Suzllivan.87 The Delaware order, being a final determination on
the merits of the action by a court of competent jurisdiction,
was entitled to full faith and credit.
The Delaware rule, patterned after Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, is contrary to CPLR 3216 which
states: "Unless the order specifies otherwise, the dismissal is not
on the merits." Perhaps New York courts should consider using
the power to dismiss on the merits. The specter of such use
would seem to be the greatest incentive for the rapid prosecution
of claims. However, due to the harshness of the penalty, its imposition should be limited to those cases in which summary judgment against the plaintiff would be appropriate.
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